The Cinematic Spectacle that Class War has become

Our recently appointed Reader in Work and Organisation, Christopher Land, takes it upon himself to dethrone the anti-working class morals symptomatic within films such as, though by no means limited to, Kingsman

Two weeks ago I saw Kingsman: a mash up of Shaw’s Pygmalion and a Roger Moore era James Bond movie, complete with insane villain intent on destroying the world with an overly complicated plot carried out from a secret mountain lair. The main action follows working-class Eggsy as he is approached by the immaculately dressed, upper-class Harry Hart (played by Colin Firth) to join a very secret service organization – the Kingsmen – operating out of a Saville Row bespoke tailor’s shop, connected by underground train to a country estate that doubles as a training ground. Eggsy is represented as a typical baseball cap wearing chav occupying a life of poverty, booze and drugs.

Entering this lumpenproletariat hell, Harry Hart arrives just in time to rescue Eggsy: first from prison and then from a beating by a local gang in the pub. Indeed, the only representations of the working class in the film are set in the pub or in a council flat, where they smoke dope on the sofa and casually perpetrate domestic violence. Eggsy’s mother lives with an abusive local gang leader and the overall image of working class London is one of violence, lack of community, and grey concrete: an image quite at odds with recent sociological studies.

At first glance, the movie could be seen as progressive. Eggsy wins out against the usual Kingsmen recruits: an assortment of Oxbridge toffs with various character flaws borne of privilege and arrogance. In this sense, he is able to transcend his impoverished background until, in the final scenes, he is transformed into a bespoke-suit-wearing super-spy, who saves the world, kills the baddies, and gets the girl.  The message, at one level, is one of equality and merit where birth rank does not, should not, determine status and achieved rank. In the Kingsman universe, talent and commitment will ultimately prevail.

This is an entirely superficial reading, however. More fundamentally Kingsmen celebrates a world dominated by upper-class aesthetics and performativities. The ideal of the gentleman, well dressed, well behaved, highly educated and oozing establishment cultural capital, is venerated throughout the film. Equality, as far as it goes, is understood as the equality of opportunity to become one of the elite. Not only does this go against a reality in which social mobility is, if anything, decreasing, it also leaves the fundamental hierarchy of social class intact and even reinforces it. Throughout the film the working class are represented as a lumpenproletariat: the chavs whose demonization has been so effectively critiqued by Owen Jones.  In this binary world the only feasible option is one of escape, either into drugs and violence, or upward social mobility. The idealised values – ethical and aesthetic – of the upper-class remain an unquestioned good, and something to be aspired to, throughout the film.

If this were just an isolated case it would not be worthy of comment. Even if this were just another example of Colin Firth being posh on screen we might dismiss it. But it is part of a wider problem: our mainsteam media and cultural industries persistently fail to represent the experiences and lives of the majority of the population. At a two day workshop recently hosted by the University of Leicester’s Mark Banks and Doris Eikhof, academics studying the cultural industries gathered together to discuss talent, merit, opportunity and selection in the cultural and creative industries. With reports on research conducted in art schools, classical music conservatoires, jazz music, film and television, fashion design, and computer gaming, the recurrent theme of the workshop was that careers in the cultural industries remain highly stratified and unequal. In almost all cases, white, able-bodied, heterosexual, middle-class, men dominate the cultural and creative industries. Women, black and ethnic minorities, the disabled and LBGT people are under-represented in all of these sectors when compared to those groups as a proportion of the UK population as a whole, or to levels of wider labour market participation.

The reason for this inequality is rarely explicit prejudice and discrimination. Rather the problem is systemic. Where formal qualifications are an entry requirement, as in most higher education institutions, the apparent objectivity and neutrality of merit measured by credentials benefits those from relatively affluent families who can afford to send their children to private schools, live in catchment areas for ‘good’ schools, or pay for private tutors to coach their children through entrance exams for selecting schools. The result, unsurprisingly, is that children from a socio-economically privilege background do better, on average, due to these advantages.

The case is a little more complex when it comes to the cultural industries and the arts. In many cases even elite conservatoires and art schools place a relatively low weight on academic qualifications. Instead they emphasise ‘talent’, which, at first glance, would seem to be more of a fair and egalitarian approach. But how can talent be recognised? As Mark Banks explained, the way that many music schools evaluate talent is through an audition, but these events are themselves spaces where ‘talent’ is performed according to culturally specific conventions and depend upon students’ abilities to understand and comport themselves in this social context according to often implicit rules. Children who have had private musical tuition will often be trained in how to audition. Those with a middle class background are more likely to understand the norms and expectations of conduct in these settings.  In effect, the audition is as much about an applicant’s cultural capital as it is any innate ‘talent’. Indeed, without being developed, trained, and demonstrated in an audition, it is hard to imagine how some raw potential could ever be assessed.

Another, very clear example, was given by Burke and McManus’ discussion of admissions interviews at art and design colleges. Applicants for a fashion course were asked, as a matter of course, where they shopped and who their favourite designer was. Whilst this may be a reasonable question for an aspiring fashion student, it reproduces economic inequality. Those who are able to shop for the kind of high-end fashion design that selectors found credible had to have access to disposable income, as well as a knowledge of design that could only be garnered by following fashion shows and industry press. This world remains inaccessible for many, as highlighted by selectors dismissal of a young, working class, black woman who was influenced by hip-hop and sports styles. These were not the ‘right’ kind of fashion for a high-prestige college, so the applicant was rejected on the basis of her cultural taste and relative difficulty in articulating this clearly and in an appropriate frame. Indeed, in the current context of widespread social inequality, some of the poorest students could not even afford the £5 bus fair to get to art college open days, so never even made it to the stage where they could be rejected in the selection process.

These inequalities do not stop at education and training. As Randle’s talk indicated, access to film and television exacerbates this privileging of the already affluent.  Getting in to these industries is often achieved through social networks, so that those with family contacts in film or television have a better chance than outsiders. Like many other cultural industries, they are disproportionately concentrated in London, and early career opportunities are often in the form of unpaid internships. Getting on in the industry requires the ability to cope with precarious and uncertain employment prospects, riding out periods of unemployment, or putting in extremely long hours when work arrives in cycles of feast and famine. These challenges are more easily met by those without caring responsibilities and with affluent parents who can support them whilst establishing a career. The project-based nature of the film industry doubles down on this systemic inequality as people are more likely to trust and feel comfortable with people who they are able to get on with socially, so will choose to work with people they already know, people similar to them. Access to projects also means remaining in regular contact with potential colleagues, for example in the pub. This creates a kind of homophily where middle class white men are more likely to employ more middle class white men, reproducing an already entrenched inequality.

So how does this relate back to Kingsman and why is any of this really so important? Well, on the one hand, a lack of diversity in the cultural and creative industries means that their products tend to reproduce the experiences and concerns of those working in them. This is not simply a ‘business case’ argument that diversity is good because it enables producers to reach a wider audience. It is important because the cultural industries produce meaning: narratives, images and ideas that shape our sense of self. Middle class, heterosexual, white men will tend to produce films that take their own identity for granted and not even realise that they are making films for people like themselves. In a diverse society, this creates a kind of democratic deficit in which anyone other than a white, middle-class, heterosexual is underrepresented, not only in the cultural industries’ workforce, but also in their products.

In Kingsman, Eggsy only becomes a full subject, in control of his own fate, when he replicates his mentor Harry, emulating him aesthetically and stylistically, as well as in his choice of profession.  For Eggsy to get in and get on in the fictitious secret service, he has to shed his former associations and identity. In this moral universe, the only valid aspiration for him is to escape from the working class and become one of the elite. There is no possibility of class politics or solidarity in such an image, just social climbing.  At a time when the only rational response to increasing inequality should be outrage at silver-spoon, inherited wealth, massive city-bonuses, and a culture of entitlement by the already privileged, escape from poverty is framed as an individualistic, aesthetic act of reshaping our image so that we not only look like the rich but act like them and identify with them.

Rather than challenging the continuing class war that the wealthy are conducting against the poorest in society, we are being encouraged to identity with the wealthy against the working class. In this, I would suggest, cultural representations like Kingsman are far from innocent or just a bit of fun. They are part of a widespread cultural front in the class war and, at least partly, the result of a material inequality within the cultural industries themselves.

Originally published at

Anti Social Finance*

Senior Lecturer in Finance and Political Economy, David Harvie, suggests the UK’s nascent social investment market is more a matter of imposing market discipline and less a matter of ‘doing well by doing good’.  

David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ star lit up the post-crisis landscape when it was first introduced in November 2009. As students of Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner will have come to expect, however, it burned too brightly and too quickly, eventually extinguished by a combination of critique, ridicule and protest. The 2010-11 austerity movement taunted the initiative and they were by no means alone.

‘Does my society look big in this?’ Photo Credit: Duncan C.

‘Does my society look big in this?’
Photo Credit: Duncan C.

2012 nevertheless saw the launch — again to much fanfare — of Big Society Capital. According to its website, the group ‘is transforming social investment in the UK to improve people’s lives’. This call for ‘doing well by doing good’ is echoed by progressive think tanks such as the New Economics Foundation.

While it’s hard to argue with people who believe themselves to be on the side of the angels, research I’ve recently published with my co-author Emma Dowling argues that social investment is anything but a progressive counterpoint to rapacious neoliberal capitalism. On the contrary, it plays an absolutely central role in neoliberalism’s extension. Social investment, we demonstrate, is designed to harness community based ethical concerns for the purposes of profit-making. Wealth-creating activities, in this sense, become subjected to measurement, helping bring about a situation what some scholars have called the ‘real subsumption of the social’. This should give us some cause for concern for reasons outlined below.

Social Investment: From State to Market

The principles underlying the social investment state are quite straightforward. Government spending on services such as health, education, social security cannot be understood as consumption spending or as part of a redistributive project. Instead, such expenditure becomes understood as a form of investment that might yield returns such as increased labour-market participation, labour productivity, wages and growth. This has become the dominant paradigm in national and international policy debates over the past few decades. It underpins, for example, World Bank recommendations for Third-World countries’ spending priorities. It also explains, at least partly, how micro-finance has become a favoured policy tool for development economics. And it has informed, and been developed through, a series of OECD reports (e.g. here and here) focusing on the spending of First World states.

We can trace the idea of social investment at least as far back as 1956, when the academic and Labour Party politician Tony Crosland published The Future of Socialism. Crosland argued that ‘as an investment, education yields a generous return: we badly need more of it’. This very idea was taken up by the ‘Third Way’ sociologist Anthony Giddens, whose thinking played an indispensable role in the New Labour project of the 1990s. According to Giddens, in The Third Way and Its Critics, the welfare state ‘need[ed] to be reconstructed as a “social investment state.”’ A key figure in moving UK policy thinking from the social investment state to the social investment market is the venture capitalist and New Labour backer, Sir Ronald Cohen. Other than leading the G8’s Social Impact Investment Task Force and being involved in Social Finance US and Social Finance Israel, Cohen has also:

  • Been appointed chair of the UK Social Investment Task Force, in 2000
  • Co-founded a social investment group called Bridges Ventures, in 2002, with Michele Giddens, Anthony’s daughter
  • Chaired the UK Commission on Unclaimed Assets, between 2005 and 2007
  • Co-founded Social Finance (UK) Ltd., in 2007
  • Chaired Big Society Capital since its launch in 2012
‘Sir Ronald Cohen: social finance mover and shaker’. Photo Credit:

‘Sir Ronald Cohen: social finance mover and shaker’.
Photo Credit:

The message running throughout these various initiatives is that two decades of neoliberal capitalist development have resulted in enormous wealth creation, on the one hand, with widening inequality and increasing poverty, on the other. The redistribution of wealth via the (welfare) state, whether to poor individuals or to poor communities, will never solve such problems, it may even exacerbate them. The poor do not lack entrepreneurial skills, in other words, what they lack is capital. These skills can be encouraged, enabled and harnessed through the creation and embedding of a social investment bank (Big Society Capital), the social impact bond (SIB), and a social investment market. SIBs, then, aren’t really ‘ordinary’ bonds: they are more like a structured product, a financial asset in which cash flows are dependent upon an underlying index or metric. According to Social Finance:

Social Impact Bonds are a form of outcomes-based contract in which public sector commissioners commit to pay for significant improvement in social outcomes (such as a reduction in offending rates, or in the number of people being admitted to hospital) for a defined population.

The world’s first SIB was launched in 2010 to finance a probation scheme in Peterborough, a small city 120 kilometres north of London. It was structured so that bondholders would receive a return on their investment if reoffending rates fell by 10% or more. The Peterborough SIB was successful to the extent that all the issued bonds were purchased, thus making the £5 million scheme viable. At the end of the scheme’s first phase, however, reoffending rates had fallen by only 8.4%, short of the targeted rate of reduction, so pay-outs were not made. A second phase will proceed in 2016, granting investors another opportunity to get their money back, while the originally planned third phase has been cancelled by the Ministry of Justice. (See, e.g., reports here and here.)

Despite such setbacks, Big Society Capital, Social Finance, Bridges Ventures, as well as a variety of so-called Social Investment Financial Intermediaries (SIFIs) continue to launch innovative social investment instruments. The British government, for its part, remains supportive. The Department for Work and Pensions, for example, has launched ten SIBs through its ‘Innovation Fund’, mostly designed to support youth employability projects, focusing on so-called NEETs. Elsewhere, Goldman Sachs has established some social investment departments while Forbes magazine has recently declared: ‘social impact bonds are going mainstream’.

Where does the appeal of such instruments lie, given the failure of the Peterborough project to address its primary goal? In the above-mentioned paper we analyse the three crises which social investment’s advocates seek to address:

  1. The crisis of social reproduction: social investment will ‘unleash up to $1 trillion of new investment to tackle social problems more innovatively and effectively’.
  2. The fiscal crisis of the state: during times of austerity there is political appeal in getting private investors to finance projects formerly funded by the public purse.
  3. The crisis of capital accumulation: capitalism needs new drivers of growth and sources of profitability, the yet to be commodified social sphere becomes understood as a possible avenue.

The Social Costs of Finance

Social investment promises — or rather threatens — more than the mere unleashing of private wealth for social good, however. This is not just a situation within which community and household activities become productive parts of the economy. It is also a situation where a social investment market is created, the consequence of which is that financial-market discipline will be imposed on such activities. While capital is unleashed, that is to say, the social will be harnessed, with potentially devastating consequences.

‘Market discipline and punish’ (Peterborough prison). Photo Credit:

‘Market discipline and punish’ (Peterborough prison).
Photo Credit:

What I have in mind here are the processes outlined by the late Randy Martin’s ‘financialisation of daily life’, and by Dick Bryan and Michael Rafferty’s, Capitalism with Derivatives. For such critics, financial markets, including ‘derivatives’, are to be understood as processes which measure the production of value and the rate of accumulation. Finance, they argue, enables all the different ‘bits’ of capital to be measured, compared, and priced. This creates an imperative for each ‘bit’ of capital, including workers and community members, to achieve a competitive rate of return. Financial investors, speculators — call them what you will — do not care whether they trade in cocoa futures, the Argentinian peso or some index linked to the FTSE100. What they seek is the greatest rate of return with the lowest level of risk. In this sense, qualitatively divergent bits of the economy and society are rendered quantitatively comparable: FTSE100 workers are pitted against international currency flows and agricultural conditions, for the potential gain of the financier.

Social investment means much more than ‘doing well by doing good’, therefore. Big Society Capital expects that many social investors will seek not only ‘a clearly articulated and reported social impact’, but also a ‘competitive’ rate of return. So probation workers, along with their ex-prisoner ‘clients’, in Peterborough, UK, will — if the social investment market develops — be required to compete with probation workers in Liverpool, the waged workers and unwaged volunteers running a youth employment skills project in East London, the workers employed by FTSE100 companies, Argentinian citizens, global agricultural labourers, and so on, as well as each other. It almost makes you pine for the Big Society.




*An earlier version of this post was first published on the Progress in Political Economy blog, on 7 January 2015.

Originally published at